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Introduction: Cooperation, Coordination and Conflict 
 
1 The cooperation of European countries in matters of insolvency has a long 
history. It has been a 40 year project within the European Union,
1
 evolving in 
complexity and increasing in cooperation as the EU has expanded and changed.
2
 
The culmination of this cooperation was the EU Insolvency Regulation
3
 which 
deals with the coordination of cross-border insolvency between member states. In 
2012, INSOL Europe
4
 proposed amendments
5
 to the EIR, aimed at furthering its 
proper functioning by amending substantive aspects and improving technical rules. 
Among the fundamental issues to be resolved was the ease with which companies 
can “forum shop”6 among member states to identify a jurisdiction providing the 
most advantageous environment to commence insolvency proceedings. However, 
goal of reducing forum shopping overall is not helped by the existence of divergent 
rules of employment protection among the member states. 
 
2 Underpinned by traditionally opposing socio-political values, the juxtaposition of 
insolvency law and employment protection is difficult to reconcile. However, in 
these times following the financial crisis and its slow recovery, business failures 
                                                 
* Jennifer Gant is a doctoral researcher at the Nottingham Law School. This article is based on 
presentations given at the Society of Legal Scholars PhD Conference in Edinburgh, Scotland on 2 
September 2013 under the title “European Insolvency and Social Policy: Harmonisation Woes” and at 
the INSOL Europe Academic Forum Annual Conference in Paris, France on 26 September 2013 under 
the title “Social Policy and the Reform of the European Insolvency Regulation”. 
1 Hereafter referred to as the “EU”. 
2 See P. Omar, European Insolvency Law (2004, Ashgate, Aldershot), at 49. 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 
2000/L160/1) (hereafter referred to as the “EIR”). 
4 INSOL Europe is an organisation of professionals and academics within the European Union 
specialising in insolvency and business reconstruction. 
5 Proposals are set out in R. van Galen et al., Revision of the European Insolvency Regulation: 
Proposals by INSOL Europe (2012, INSOL Europe, Nottingham). 
6 Ibid., at 17: “...the transferring of assets or judicial proceedings from one Member state to another 
seeking to obtain a more favourable legal position...”. 
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and unemployment are both at the forefront of economic concerns. The EU has 
applied itself to the intersection of employment protection and insolvency 
procedures within the Acquired Rights Directive,
7
 which contains provisions 
requiring the transfer of employment contracts to the buyer of a business or a part 
thereof upon its transfer,
8
 including those transfers which occur as a result of 
corporate rescue procedures. As the ARD provisions took the form of an EU 
directive, the form and method of implementation of the ARD was left to the 
member states as long as the intended results of the directive were achieved within 
national legislation. A number of derogations were also available within the ARD, 
including the potential to disapply the transfer provisions if the transferor were: 
 
“…subject to bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceedings which have 
been instituted with a view to [the] liquidation....” of a company.9 
 
3 The application of employee transfer provisions in corporate rescue procedures 
has not failed to cause controversy over the 37 years since its initial 
implementation, significantly as the derogation for insolvency procedures was not 
present in the original ARD.
10
 Many EU and national cases have caused further 
complications, particularly in relation to how national social policies affect the aims 
of corporate rescue with regard to the relative favouritism of the safeguarding of 
employment. 
 
4 Social policy legislation also has an effect on how insolvency systems function in 
practice as the procedural outcomes can affect a variety of more vulnerable entities 
such as employees, their families, and the community at large. The relative 
protection of these more vulnerable entities differs from member state to member 
state according to diverse national views on the importance of social policy matters. 
A conception of the effectiveness of insolvency and business rescue procedures that 
includes a reflection upon the interaction of state and EU requirements of employee 
protection legislation would likely encourage a more holistic approach to 
improving cross-border insolvency within the EU. While such a matter is not 
strictly the prevue of EU insolvency law in its current scope, there are practical 
matters affecting how a pan-European rescue culture can function with the greatest 
efficiency when the conflicting goals of insolvency and the protection of 
employment are not recognised and, to some extent, managed. 
 
                                                 
7 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the member 
states relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (OJ 2001 L82/16) (hereafter all Acquired Rights 
Directives will be referred to as the “ARD”). 
8 Ibid., Article 3(1) (in Chapter II “Safeguarding of Employee’s Rights”). 
9 Ibid., Article 5. 
10 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the member 
states relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses (OJ 1977 L061/26). 
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5 Among the EU member states that continue to exhibit fundamentally different 
approaches to corporate rescue and employment protection, the United Kingdom
11
 
and France present two extreme examples. Through the comparison of two 
divergent but also highly influential EU jurisdictions, both historically and in the 
current political climate, an example of the obstacles facing overall convergence in 
this area can be demonstrated. The differences in these two jurisdictions will also 
help to highlight the problems associated with differing levels of social protection 
in terms of jurisdictional competitiveness and cross-border cooperation. This article 
will discuss the parallel evolution of corporate rescue and the implementation of the 
ARD in the UK and France with a view to illuminating these obstacles to 
convergence. While harmonisation in the area of social policy continues to be 
resisted by many member states, it could be that such harmonisation or at least 
convergence might assist in capturing a greater cohesiveness in cross-border 
business and insolvency and level the field of competition between the member 
states of the EU. 
 
 
The Evolution of Modern Insolvency Systems and Corporate Rescue 
 
European Insolvency Systems 
 
6 The concept of bankruptcy has existed since ancient Roman magistrates were 
“breaking the benches” of traders who failed to repay their debts, and even before 
that among other advanced ancient races. The aims of ancient bankruptcy laws 
were initially the punishment, sometimes with extreme violence and barbarity, of 
those who had fallen into debt, regardless of reason or fault. The treatment of the 
early insolvent trader was by way of criminal sanction, resulting in a stigma that has 
been transmitted into modern concepts of insolvency by varying degrees in 
different jurisdictions. Decriminalisation of insolvency appears to have occurred in 
parallel with the growing importance of commercial life and the recognition that 
insolvency was sometimes an inevitable result of entrepreneurial ambition.
12
 
 
7 In the UK, the origins of corporate insolvency law were linked to the 
development of the joint stock company during the nineteenth century.
13
 Until the 
1860s, English bankruptcy law had the sole purpose of debt collection by seizing 
the debtor’s assets. Early procedures functioned as a continuation of private 
remedies with some collective aspects.
14
 The Joint Stock Companies Winding-Up 
Act 1844,
15
 the Bankruptcy Acts
16
 and the Companies Act of 1862
17
 introduced 
                                                 
11 Hereafter referred to as the “UK”. 
12 Omar, above note 2, at 3-4, 10. 
13 See the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c.110). 
14 See J. Sgard, “On Market Discipline: Bankruptcy, Debt Discharge and Renegotiation in England and 
France (17th - 19th Century)”, Paper given at ISNIE Annual Conference, Reykjavik (2007), at 6-7. 
15 7 & 8 Vict. c.111. 
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modern concepts of insolvency, such as the statutory regime for preferential debts, 
the pari passu
18
 principle and specific court led procedures for winding up.
19
 A 
number of Acts were passed and cases heard by the Chancery Court that helped to 
develop the law of insolvency further. However, this resulted in layers of law that 
were difficult to operate and prone to manipulation. These problems would attract 
the attention of reformers in the 1970s.
20
 
 
8 French bankruptcy provisions were heavily influenced by the importation of the 
Italian legacy of lex mercatoria,
21
 which had fashioned bankruptcy into an open 
ended flexible instrument to resolve the debtor’s estate. Early institutions of French 
bankruptcy law set out in Title XI of the Ordonnance sur le Commerce of 1673 
under the reign of Louis XIV provided for amnesties and letters of royal pardon to 
compensate for the punitive nature of insolvency, as well as methods of liquidating 
a debtor’s estate.22 The 1673 ordinance codified the customs and rules of the lex 
mercatoria,
23
 brought in by the flood of Italian traders and bankers during France’s 
time of significant financial and commercial potency in the seventeenth century.
24
 
Following the French Revolution of 1789 and the years of instability which 
followed it, Napoleon Bonaparte
25
 was able to take advantage of the chaos as a 
justification to impose order through the development of his Civil Code, which by 
1808 included provisions on insolvency. The 1808 insolvency code offered a menu 
of options to the parties. However, the nature of the legislation retained its former 
repressiveness, giving courts wide powers of arrest and detention of insolvent 
debtors. While subsequent reforms codified some of the harsher provisions in 1838 
and 1889, the modern version of French insolvency law would not be recognisable 
until reforms taking place in the 1960s.
26
 
 
9 Both the British and French jurisdictions approached insolvency in different ways 
in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. Britain focussed on liquidation as the 
sole result of engaging in the insolvency procedures, implying that the failure to 
                                                                                                                 
16 See Bankruptcy Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c.47); Bankruptcy Act 1869 (32 &33 Vict c.71); 
Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c.52); and Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. 5 c.59).  
17 25 & 26 Vict. c.134. 
18 Originally defined by Henry VIII in the Statute of Bankrupts 1542 (34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c.4) as “a 
portion, rate and rate alike, according to the quantity of their debts.” 
19 See R. Goode, Sir, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Student Edition) (2005, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London), at 6-9. 
20 See V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd ed) (2009, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge), at 12-13. 
21 Sgard, above note 14. 
22 See A. Sorensen and P. Omar, Corporate Rescue Procedures in France (1996, Kluwer Law 
International, London), at 22-23. 
23 The “law merchant”. 
24 See J. Sgard, “Bankruptcy, Fresh Start, and Debt Renegotiation in England and France (17th to 19th 
Century)”, Chapter 14 in T. Safley (ed), The History of Bankruptcy: Economic, Social and Cultural 
Implications in Early Modern Europe (2013, Routledge, Abingdon Oxon) (223-235), at 224-225. 
25 Ruled from 1804-1814 and for 100 days in 1815. 
26 Sorensen and Omar, above note 22, at 23. 
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pay one’s debts needed to be sanctioned in the harshest manner possible. The 
British regime essentially expected debtors to deal with pre-crisis issues in order to 
avoid the draconian measures that would be taken should they no longer be able to 
repay their debts. France, however, had made renegotiation a possibility which 
softened the risk associated with business activities, allowing the creation of 
institutions that would help debtors to address financial shocks after they had 
occurred.
27
 Thus in France a concept of rehabilitation has roots which run much 
further into the past than does the UK. 
 
The Development of Corporate Rescue 
 
10 It has only been relatively recently that the concept of corporate rescue has been 
recognised as a legitimate aim of insolvency systems when views on insolvency 
changed in the 1960s. It had been realised that the economic benefits of the 
preservation of a company was an equally important consideration to the 
maximisation of creditor returns.
28
 The corporate rescue ethos initially developed in 
United States legal system. This concept was rapidly transplanted throughout the 
rest of the Western world. Its purpose was the revival of companies that are on the 
brink of economic collapse and salvaging those units that could be viably saved in 
order to promote the restoration of production, the safeguarding of employment, 
and the continued reward of capital and profit to the benefit of the economy at 
large.
29
 Thus, there was a development of preservation measures and external 
controls which were aimed at trying to prevent an irreversible decline in a 
company. This was the introduction of what would later be termed a “rescue 
culture” which encapsulated a new desire for economic entities to be able to impose 
greater controls on their futures.
30
 The rescue culture would eventually be 
integrated into the philosophy of the EU and become a part of the aims and 
purposes EU insolvency conventions and regulations. 
 
11 In France, while the procedure of règlement judiciare
31
 was introduced in the 
first substantial reform of insolvency law in 1955,
32
 the modern concept of 
corporate rescue in France arrived with the Law of 1967,
33
 which provided for 
either a règlement judiciare or a liquidation judiciare.
34
 The former was chosen if 
the result of the process was likely to be a composition agreement with creditors 
while the debtor continued to trade, “rescuing” the business from liquidation. The 
latter was chosen if there was little likelihood of survival and resulted in the 
                                                 
27 Sgard, above note 14, at 7. 
28 Omar, above note 2, at 11-12. 
29 See P. Omar, “Thoughts on the Purpose of Corporate Rescue” (1997) 12(4) Journal of International 
Banking Law 127. 
30 Omar, above note 2, at 11-12. 
31 Translated as “judicial settlement”. 
32 Law no. 55-583 of 20 May 1955. 
33 Law no. 67-563 of 13 July 1967. 
34 Translated as “judicial liquidation”. 
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liquidation of the debtors assets. The Court would choose from these options based 
on their view of the viability of the business.
 
The law of redressement
35
 was 
introduced later in 1967 which was aimed at those businesses whose insolvency had 
grave consequences on the economy and were, while insolvent, not irretrievable. It 
included a moratorium and a mechanism for the settlement of debts and repayment. 
The reforms of 1967 were, however, designed to meet the requirements of a 
relatively prosperous France. The general outcomes were poor, saving few 
businesses from collapse and resulting in detriment to creditors, employees and 
shareholders alike. While many attempts at reform were made between 1967 and 
1985, a new law on insolvency was only created during the latter year and would 
endure for almost a decade.
36
 
 
12 The UK arrived a bit later in its adoption of the rescue culture. At the time when 
France was focussing on rescue and rehabilitation, the focus of UK insolvency 
legislation remained to a certain degree maximising returns to creditors by 
replacing the chaotic pursuit of individual claims with a statutory regime 
suspending creditors’ rights and providing a mechanism for the orderly collection 
and realisation of assets and their distribution to creditors through a scheme of 
distribution.
37
 However, changes in the market, social policy, and the economic 
climate eroded this paradigm of British insolvency law,
38
 resulting in the initiation 
of massive reforms to its insolvency laws, enacted in 1986 and subsequently.
39
 
 
13 The prospective entry of the UK into the European Economic Community
40
 in 
the 1970s also demanded that the UK should be capable of negotiating with other 
member states under a coordinated insolvency convention. The EEC had been 
contemplating the need for a coordinating bankruptcy convention in order to 
achieve harmonisation since a working party was convened in 1963 to examine the 
case for it.
41
 A report produced in 1970 included just such a convention drafted by 
the French for enactment in the member states. The purpose of the EEC Bankruptcy 
Convention was to universalise and unify the law, procedure and operation of 
bankruptcy throughout the existing member states.
42
 However, the philosophies and 
structures of national bankruptcy laws varied significantly throughout the member 
states in views of the role and weight attributed to creditor versus debtor interests, 
the survival of viable economic entities versus optimal creditor protection, and the 
                                                 
35 Often translates as “recovery”. 
36 Sorensen and Omar, above note 22, at 24. 
37 Goode, above note 19, at 5. 
38 See J. Silkenat and C. Schmerler, The Law of International Insolvencies and Debt Restructurings 
(2006, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry NY), at 387. 
39 See M. Hunter, “The Nature and Functions of the Rescue Culture” (1999) Journal of Business Law 
426, at 455. 
40 The precursor of the EU, which lasted from 1957 to 1973, hereafter referred to as the “EEC”. 
41 Omar, above note 2, at 53-57. 
42 Hunter, above note 39. 
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protection of labour over economic efficiency.
43
 As a result of these seemingly 
irreconcilable differences, this draft was the first of a number of versions, including 
a draft produced in 1973 necessitated by the accession of three new member states, 
among them the UK.
44
 
 
14 The UK assigned the 1973 draft EEC Bankruptcy Convention to a committee 
chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork to assess the acceptability of the draft convention in 
the context of the current British insolvency regime. The report published in 1976 
highlighted a number of serious problems and anomalies in the British insolvency 
system that would need to be resolved if UK procedures were to be capable of 
harmonisation.
45
 While the Convention was viewed as being advantageous in terms 
of its perceived benefit to creditors, there would be many practical obstacles to 
overcome, including the vagueness of terms defining the centre of administration, 
an issue that remains under examination today.
46
 The process of assessing the 
Convention in relation to the UK insolvency regime did have the effect of focussing 
the attention of lawmakers on the need for reform, which resulted in the Insolvency 
Act of 1976. Its provisions were useful, but not fundamental in terms of reforming 
the UK system.
47
 
 
15 The recognition that the previous reforms had not served to produce the 
fundamental changes required to reform the UK insolvency led to the appointment 
by the Secretary of State for Trade of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, also 
chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork, in 1977 (the “Cork Committee”). The Cork 
Committee was tasked with reviewing the law relating to insolvency, consider 
required reforms, examine the potential for formulating a comprehensive 
insolvency system, suggest possible less formal procedures and make any other 
relevant recommendations. A report of the Cork Committee (the “Cork Report”) 
was then published in 1982 containing detailed and critical examination of all the 
existing procedures as well as a number of recommendations aimed at procedures 
that catered for rescue and rehabilitation of companies in distress.
48
 It stressed that 
a comprehensive review of insolvency was required not only for the purposes of 
negotiating with other member states, but also due to the poor state of the law,
49
 
which: 
 
“…has been tinkered with, patched and extended by false analogies so that today it is replete 
with anomalies, inconsistencies and deficiencies.” 
 
                                                 
43 See M. Balz, “The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings” (1996) 70 American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal 485. 
44 Omar, above note 2, at 53-57. 
45 Hunter, above note 39. 
46 Omar, above note 2, at 56. 
47 Hunter, above note 39. 
48 Idem. 
49 Finch, above note 20, at 13-14. 
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16 Further, the law was viewed as no longer fulfilling its obligation to the demands 
of fairness and justice in a modern society.
50
 
 
Business Rescue in the 1980s 
 
17 The EEC Bankruptcy Convention drafted in 1973 met with a number of 
obstacles that stood in the way of its willing adoption among the member states. 
There was significant conflict associated with the application of the concepts of 
universality and unity within the convention due to the widely different approaches 
to reorganisation and insolvency. Universality would guarantee that bankruptcies 
would be mutually recognised in member states while unity meant that a 
bankruptcy proceeding opened in one state would prohibit other states from 
opening proceedings.
51
 However, fundamental differences in the social and political 
stances among the member states as well as differing levels of legislative 
interventionism made the acquiescence to the interference with individual state 
sovereignty difficult to accept. Despite the continued difficulty in coordinating an 
EU wide insolvency convention, a second draft EC convention on insolvency was 
published in the official journal of the European Community
52
 in 1982. Though 
comparable to the first draft that had received much criticism in 1973, the 
provisions were simplified and therefore welcomed as a potential working 
convention. A number of revisions, modifications and refinements were made but 
work on a new convention was halted due to a number of organisational issues 
within the EC. There was also a failure to reach a consensus on the second draft of 
the convention, so by 1984 it had become obvious that the convention in its current 
form was unrealistic.
53
 A European insolvency convention was now on a hiatus. 
 
18 Both England and France saw changes to their insolvency systems in the mid-
1980s that shifted the focus from liquidation and creditor wealth maximisation to 
the rescue or rehabilitation of companies. A more social approach to insolvency 
had developed among Western nations which left scope for, and indeed justified, 
rescue activities according to the individual values contained within the corporate 
rescue principles of each jurisdiction.
54
 
 
19 In the UK, one result of the Cork Report was a new definition of the aims of a 
good modern insolvency system, which should aim to: 
 
“...recognise that the effects of insolvency are not limited to the private 
interests of the insolvent and his creditors, but that other groups in society 
                                                 
50 See K. Cork, Sir (Chairman), Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (1982) 
(Cmnd. 8558), at 10 (paragraph 9). 
51 Balz, above note 43. 
52 Hereafter referred to as the “EC”. 
53 Omar, above note 2, at 73; Balz, above note 43. 
54 Finch, above note 20, at 245-246. 
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are vitally affected by the insolvency and its outcome, and to ensure that 
these public interests are recognised and safeguarded.”55 
 
20 This was an entirely new approach and perception of the aims of insolvency law, 
including a truly social message that was recommended to be incorporated in the 
imminent reforms. The Cork Report also recognised and formulated the concept of 
a rescue culture, stating that given that the failure of commercial enterprises has 
wide repercussions on a variety of stakeholders including but not limited to 
creditors, shareholders, employees, suppliers and others who would be adversely 
affected by business failure, a legitimate aim of insolvency laws should be to have 
concern for the livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon an enterprise.
56
 
In the view of Cork Committee, the rescue culture would come to manifest itself in 
policies directed at the more benevolent treatment of insolvent legal entities as well 
as the more draconian treatment of the unscrupulous abusers of the system. It would 
also mean the steady removal of the stigmatising effect of bankruptcy.
57
 Though 
beneficent in their view of what the future should hold for insolvency, the Cork 
Committee’s more socially oriented recommendations would mostly fall upon deaf 
ears. 
 
21 The publication and consideration of the Cork Report by parliamentary 
legislators resulted in the passage of a new Insolvency Act in 1986,
58
 preceded 
briefly by the Insolvency Act 1985.
59
 The 1986 Act put into practice many of the 
suggestions published in the Cork Report. Cork’s philosophy was, among other 
things, in favour of increasing the emphasis on rehabilitation of the company, as 
such, he recommended an administration procedure aimed at business rescue which 
would also ameliorate the plight of the unsecured creditor, who generally received 
nothing in traditional the old procedures. The procedure of administration was 
introduced as a court based procedure designed specifically for corporate rescue 
rather than asset realisation, focussed on the interests of unsecured creditors. While 
Cork’s broad policy was aimed at the rehabilitation of the company, the 1986 Act 
did not go as far as he perceived was necessary to achieve this end.
60
 
 
22 In France, the law was reformed in response to the changing economic climate. 
An emphasis on social policy encouraged a move to the maintenance of businesses 
in the place of liquidation. The harmful effects of unemployment caused by 
business failures in recessionary times were an influence on the creation of a 
corporate rescue policy biased toward the protection of employment and the 
rehabilitation of the business.
61
 The Law of 1985
62
 was passed with the objective of 
                                                 
55 Cork Report, at paragraph 198(i) (in Chapter 4). 
56 Ibid., at paragraphs 203-204. 
57 Hunter, above note 39. 
58 1986 c.45. 
59 1985 c.65. 
60 Finch, above note 20, at 15-21, 754-779. 
61 Sorensen and Omar, above note 22, at 26. 
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protecting employment at the risk of sacrificing creditors’ rights. It envisaged three 
possible outcomes: 
 
(1) a plan for continuing the business; 
(2) a plan for its sale; or 
(3) winding up with court supervision.63 
 
23 The law reduced creditors’ rights in favour of focusing on saving the business 
and the jobs associated with it at all costs.
64
 This approach was later viewed as too 
biased in favour of labour and unsuited to allowing the French economy to evolve 
in the highly competitive global market.
65
 However, the focus on employment 
protection and business rescue has not been lost in subsequent reforms to the 
French insolvency code. 
 
24 Work was recommenced on an EC insolvency convention with the publication 
of proposals by a working group and then the draft of a European Bankruptcy (or 
Insolvency) Convention in 1991. The objectives of the new draft convention aimed 
to maintain a minimum level of opt-out, adopt a system of secondary proceedings, 
encourage the harmonisation of rules on conflict of laws,
66
 with appropriate 
account taken of the rescue regimes already present throughout the EC.
67
 A draft 
was produced in 1994 that was approved by the Council of Ministers in 1995. The 
draft met with substantial agreement and was welcomed as finally providing a 
realistic framework that could deal with the growing phenomena of cross-border 
insolvencies. Unfortunately, the convention never entered into force due to the 
obstinacy of the British, owing to disagreements over a crisis in the agricultural 
sector at the time.
68
 
 
25 France underwent another set of reforms to its insolvency system in 1994. The 
purpose of this reform was the reinforcement of those measures available during the 
pre-insolvency stage, to redress some of the rights of creditors during insolvency 
proceedings, and to ensure greater equity in the plans resulting in the sale of a 
business. The 1994 reforms attempted to create more balance between the interests 
                                                                                                                 
62 Law no. 85-98 of 25 January 1985. 
63 See P. Théry, “The Evolution of Insolvency Law in France”, Chapter 1 in W-G. Ringe et al., (eds), 
Current Issues in European Financial and Insolvency Law: Perspectives from France and the UK  
(2009, Hart Publishing, Portland OR) (1-16). 
64 Silkenat and Schmerler, above note 38, at 143. 
65 Ibid., at 143. 
66 Conflict of laws is otherwise known as private international law. It concerns relations across different 
legal jurisdictions between persons, and sometimes also companies, corporations and other legal 
entities. 
67 Balz, above note 43. 
68 See P. Omar, “The European Insolvency Regulation 2000: A Paradigm of International Insolvency 
Cooperation” (2003) 15(1) Bond Law Review 215. 
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of the company and its creditors.
69
 The UK system would not undergo another 
significant change until 2002 and France would follow soon thereafter. 
 
Business Rescue Today 
 
26 Following the failure of the 1995 European Bankruptcy (or Insolvency) 
Convention, the project was undertaken anew in the form of a proposal for what is 
now the EIR, which incorporated most of the 1995 Convention provisions 
verbatim. The use of an EU regulation as the legislative instrument meant that it 
would have direct effect in member states and would also confer power upon the 
Court of Justice to interpret it. The important elements of the EIR include the 
introduction of a principle of qualified unity in the rules for international 
jurisdiction in main proceedings based on the centre of main interests (“COMI”). 
Qualified unity precludes the opening of insolvency proceedings in other member 
states. The EIR also relies upon a principle of qualified universality in which main 
proceedings cover the whole of a debtor’s worldwide assets, while allowing 
secondary proceedings in another member state with a number of restrictions. 
Mutual recognition of judgments on procedures heard in other EU jurisdictions is 
also conferred by the EIR.
70
 
 
27 The EIR entered into force in 2002 with the purpose of enabling cross-border 
insolvency to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for the coordination of 
the measures taken with regard to a debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. It 
was recognised within the EIR that it would not be practical to introduce insolvency 
proceedings with universal scope within the EU.
71
 The reasons for this lie with 
differing laws on security interests and the different preferential rights enjoyed by 
certain creditors during insolvency proceedings,
72
 in particular those of employees. 
By as early as 2006, issues associated with ambiguity in the definition of COMI 
were recognised in the EIR, as courts of different jurisdictions habitually 
interpreted this concept in different ways.
73
 This as well as other issues have led to 
recommendations to reform the EIR, culminating in proposals put forward by the 
European Commission in 2012 which have been debated and are currently under 
consideration by the European Council which will then seek to agree with the 
European Parliament upon proposed legislation. A new regulation is probably 
unlikely until 2016.
74
 
 
                                                 
69 Sorensen and Omar, above note 22, at 28. 
70 Goode, above note 19, at 565-566. 
71 Recital 11, EIR. 
72 See B. Wessels, “Cross-border Insolvency Law in Europe: Present Status and Future Prospects” 
(2008) 11(1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 68. 
73 See G. Moss and C. Paulus, “The European Insolvency Regulation – The Case for Urgent Reform” 
(2006) 19(1) Insolvency Intelligence 1. 
74 See C. Laughton, “The European Insolvency Regulation: Amendment Proposals from the European 
Commission and the European Parliament – What next?” (2014 Spring) Eurofenix 20. 
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28 The French system has undergone some species of reform nearly every decade 
since 1967. Its fundamental perspective on insolvency is as a collective procedure 
designed to distribute loss among all stakeholders in a company, subject to a certain 
hierarchy of distribution where employees are often privileged over creditors. The 
system exhibits redistribution tendencies that are recognisable as characteristics 
endemic to its version of social democracy. The balance between the rights of 
employees and creditors has been a consideration in attempts to reform the 
insolvency code,
75
 leading to the Law of 2005.
76
 In the period leading up to the 
promulgation of this law, it was observed that the previous insolvency code had in 
many instances failed to keep a company from falling into a terminal financial 
condition. Other pressures for reform included the coming into force of the EIR and 
a view that the French insolvency regime was too debtor friendly, particularly when 
this view is coupled with the perennial French concern for job security.
77
 
 
29 The Law of 2005 includes an entirely new procedure (sauvegarde)
78
 which is 
available to debtor companies before the formal cessation de paiements
79
 situation 
occurs. It was designed as an anticipatory debtor-in-possession rescue procedure 
where the business could benefit from a moratorium while conceiving of and 
proposing a plan to creditors with a view to restructuring the business.
80
 This Law 
was reformed by ordinance in 2008,
81
 partly as a result of the poor utilisation of the 
sauvegarde procedure. In large part the 2008 ordinance addresses perceived 
inefficiencies in this procedure with the aim of encouraging recourse to upstream 
rescue by clarifying the criterion for access to the procedure, the functioning of 
creditors’ committees and their role in the procedure. It also aims at enhancing the 
operation other insolvency procedures such as conciliation and judicial 
liquidation.
82
 A further decree in March 2014 made additional modifications to the 
sauvegarde procedure aimed at facilitating the anticipation of the worsening of 
financial difficulties, enhancing process efficiency in relation to the roles of 
creditors, debtor and shareholders, and to more realistically treat those situations 
that are irrecoverable in relation to the rights of creditors and debtors. It also aims 
to improve the procedural rules in relation to security, simplicity and efficacy.
83
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76 Law no. 2005-845 of 26 July 2005. 
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30 While the most recent reforms have softened the draconian treatment of 
creditors relative to employees, apart from heavier consultation obligations issued 
from the most recent decree, the social objectives of protecting employment 
continue to affect the way in which courts deal with specific insolvency cases. In 
general, there is an emphasis on trying to save jobs in the French system. At times 
there are compromises made between the social objectives and financial objectives 
in cases of businesses sold as going concerns.
84
 This can result in choices that 
favour employees but result in reduced funds available in distributions to creditors. 
In other words, the social objectives of employment protection and their costs 
reduce the value of a business being sold; thereby reducing the distributions 
available to creditors, but this is generally acceptable due to the French emphasis 
on workers’ rights. 
 
31 Insolvency law in the UK today is still based on the Insolvency Act 1986; 
however, changes were made to it through the Enterprise Act 2002.
85
 The EA 
effected a significant change in the stance on insolvency and corporate rescue in the 
UK. The view was now that preventative intervention should take place at the 
earliest opportunity, thus the EA introduced a number of reforms that were 
designed to assist troubled companies by fostering the rescue culture.
86
 What is 
meant by this in British terms is that insolvency legislation should take on a 
positive and protective role rather than a corrective and punitive role. Interpretation 
of socio-economic related statutes should be deliberately inclined towards giving a 
positive and socially profitable meaning, rather than a negative and socially 
destructive one.
87
 The EA was aimed at the furtherance of the rescue culture and 
also encouraged companies to consider insolvency risks in advance of a final 
financial crisis.
88
 
 
32 The EA replaced administrative receivership with the provisions of the 
administration procedure and ring-fenced a portion of funds for the benefit of 
unsecured creditors.
89
 The administration procedure was also streamlined to make 
it easier and less expensive to use and also to give unsecured creditors more rights. 
One of its original purposes was to provide a means of rehabilitating a debtor 
company in financial crisis and protecting it from creditor claims. This was 
reinforced in the EA
90
 by the inclusion of Schedule B1 in the Insolvency Act which 
provided for three hierarchical objectives of administration: 
 
(1) to rescue the company as a going concern; 
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(2) to achieve a better result for creditors in a winding up; or 
(3) if the first two are not reasonably practicable, to realise property for the benefit of 
secured or preferential creditors.91 
 
33 While the existence of rehabilitative procedures and their priority in usage is 
uncontested, some insolvency practitioners have informally expressed their 
disillusionment with them in practice. In the experience of one anonymous 
practitioner, what actually happens in the prioritising of outcomes in administration 
procedures is not necessarily what one would expect from the letter of the law or 
the findings in cases. 
 
Employees in Business Rescue Procedures 
 
34 One area where France and the UK share a small commonality is the position of 
employees as preferential creditors, though the level of preference diverges. In 
France, unpaid employees are creditors in an insolvency procedure but have certain 
additional benefits. Employees enjoy a general lien over the employer’s property 
which stands as a guarantee for six months’ worth of wages and compensation in 
place of wages, though the lien does not enjoy a high rank in the order of priority. 
Employees also have access to a guarantee fund where funds are not readily 
available to pay employee claims.
92
 Employees are also given a super priority for a 
limited part of their claim which ranks above all other claims, including those of 
secured creditors and also affords employees the facility to avoid the disruption and 
delay of the proceedings so that they can be paid quickly. In the event that 
redundancies are envisaged, an employee safeguard plan must be put in place 
which serves to ensure that everything has been done to prevent the loss of jobs, 
further indicating the favouritism enjoyed by employees in these situations in 
France. Though governed by the EU Directive on Collective Redundancies,
93
 
France has given far greater protections than the minimum standards set out in the 
Directive. Most procedures that may have an effect on the rights of employees have 
significant court involvement as well.
94
 
 
35 Employees in the UK also retain the status of preferential creditors.
95
 Unpaid 
wages and accrued holiday pay are given preferential priority in a distribution. 
These are payable in advance of unsecured claims out of the assets of the company. 
Employees are also able to claim against the state National Insurance Fund in 
respect of a number of unpaid debts associated with their employment. Unpaid 
                                                 
91 Schedule B1, paragraph 3, Insolvency Act 1986 (1986 c. 45). 
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employee pension contributions are also preferential for up to four months. Unpaid 
employer pension contributions are also preferential, but limited.
96
 In terms of 
collective redundancies, the UK took a lighter option from the Directive on 
Collective Redundancies in its implementation which has allowed a number of 
cases to circumvent the consultative requirements of the Directive. This has not 
occurred without a significant amount of litigation on certain ambiguous terms. In 
general, UK employees do not enjoy the level of protection afforded to their 
counterparts in France. 
 
36 There is an inevitable tension between creditors’ rights in insolvency and the 
rights of a company’s employees.97 If the goal of insolvency is to maximise the 
distribution to creditors, then preferring employees raises their claims above those 
of other creditors and effectively take funds out of the pool of assets to satisfy their 
claims in preference, creating a super priority which raises issues of fairness to the 
treatment of other creditors in insolvency.
98
 There is also an argument that the 
concept of corporate rescue brings with it parallel goals of a social nature, such as 
the protection of employment, the effect of business failure on a community, and 
questions that go beyond the purely business oriented outcomes of insolvency. 
European Social Policy has succeeded in applying its views on the importance of 
employment protection through the application of the ARD on business transfers 
generally, but including those transfers occurring out of corporate rescue 
procedures. The latter has caused controversy related to the effect that its 
application may have on the success of business rescue and whether the goals of 
safeguarding employees can be reached if the liabilities associated with them then 
cause businesses to fail. However, other jurisdictions have accepted the application 
of the ARD in rescue procedures as a natural result of national social policy 
initiatives. 
 
 
EU Social Policy and Acquired Rights 
 
The Background to a Social Europe 
 
37 Social policy refers to the provision of services, income and protection for those 
citizens unable to or who are in a weaker bargaining position to support or protect 
themselves. The basis for social policies stem from human rights protected by the 
EU and national court systems and the social ills they are aimed to resolve. Though 
the background to social policy is universal, the level and form of investment in 
these matters vary from country to country.
99
 Until fairly recently, social policy had 
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been viewed as a poor relation in the process of European integration. The Treaty 
of Rome merely exhorted the member states to improve working conditions and 
standard of living for workers without actually conferring any rights on the workers 
themselves. The initial view was that economic integration itself would ensure an 
optimum social system through the removal of obstacles to free movement. The 
Spaak Report
100
 drawn up prior to the Treaty of Rome rejected the idea of trying to 
harmonize social policy within the EC because it was thought that as higher costs 
tended to accompany higher productivity, the differences between countries were 
not as great as they appeared.
101
 In the early days of the EC, the absence of a 
clearly identifiable social policy can be explained by the fact that social policy and 
labour law lay at the heart of the sovereignty of member states and were viewed as 
a means of preserving their integrity and political stability.
102
 
 
38 EC social policy was evolving on a similar theme in the 1970s to that of 
corporate rescue. The social dimension of the EC had begun to grow in importance, 
recognising that a philosophy of economic growth based on neo-liberal ideology 
was not capable of addressing the social problems consequential to economic 
integration. An Action Programme
103
 was conceived with the intention of attaining 
full and better employment, improving working conditions, and increasing the 
involvement of management and labour in the economic and social decision making 
within the Community as well as in the life of the undertaking.
104
 Following on 
from this, an ambitious social action plan proposed mandates in the areas of health 
and safety, minimum wages, working hours, employee participation and contract 
labour.
105
 The resulting legislative activity culminated in the adoption of a number 
of directives in the fields of sexual equality, health and safety, the transfer of 
undertakings and insolvent employers.
106
 However, the Commission’s successes in 
these areas were overshadowed by its failures; its proposals simply strayed too far 
from national practices in many member states.
107
 
 
39 In the 1980s, the UK government objected to the interference with its 
sovereignty which EC social policy represented. During this period of increased 
social consciousness in the EC, the ruling UK Conservative party was in favour of 
labour market deregulation to ensure maximum labour market flexibility. While the 
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European Commission recognised the need for a flexible workforce, it refused to 
compromise on its commitment to safeguard the rights of employees. The UK was 
able to impede the will of the Commission, however, as social policy measures 
required unanimity at that time. This was to change with the introduction of the 
Single European Act in 1989 when the UK conceded ground on the requirement for 
unanimity, accepting that qualified majority voting could be used in relation to 
health and safety and the gradual implementation of minimum standards. The 
concession of the UK gave the Commission a means of circumventing the UK veto 
despite British hostility toward EC social policy objectives. The EC could 
surreptitiously include more broadly employment related issues under the heading 
of health and safety which required only qualified majority voting. In this way, 
directives on working time, pregnant and young workers were passed, despite the 
fact that these also related to the rights and interests of employed persons which 
continued to required unanimous voting.
108
 
 
40 In 1991, the Commission sought to extend the qualified majority voting further 
into the field of social policy. A new social chapter was introduced into what was to 
become known as the Maastricht Treaty.
109
 However, the UK’s staunch objections 
to the social chapter required a political compromise in order to save the treaty as a 
whole. The social chapter was therefore left out of the main body of the Maastricht 
Treaty, placing it instead in a separate Social Policy Agreement and Social Policy 
Protocol, making it possible for the UK to opt out of its effects.
110
 The existence of 
this “two track social Europe” was short lived as the UK Labour party came to 
power in 1997
 
with the promise of social justice and inclusion. In addition to a 
number of labour reforms, the government also chose to accept the Social Chapter 
of the Maastricht Treaty and would take the necessary steps to bind itself thereto.
111
 
 
41 The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the provisions of the Social Chapter 
directly in 1997. It also created a new employment chapter which set a high level of 
employment as a central objective of the EU. In 1999 employment policy moved to 
the forefront of the agenda in the EU,
112
 admitting through its inclusion that there 
were increased interdependencies between economic policy of the EU and national 
social policies. If national markets were closed and independent, social policy 
would remain a domestic concern. However, once the EU had created the Common 
Market with a common currency, social policy in one country becomes relevant to 
other states as it can affect the integrity of the currency and the competitiveness of 
the larger trans-national market.
113
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42 The Treaty of Nice which came into effect in 2003 also provided for a 
fundamental development of social policy in the EU. In it the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU was adopted. In terms of its effects on legislation 
under the Social Chapter, it at least helps to provide a counterweight to the neo-
liberal orientation of the Treaty and provides the Court with the jurisdiction to 
reconcile social and economic rights, at least to the extent that the scope of EU law 
will allow. It was hoped that this would also avoid states removing social rights as a 
means of improving competitiveness within the market in what has been termed a 
“race to the bottom”.114 However, EU social policy remains within the domain of 
member states to determine, requiring unanimous decision making in areas falling 
under its definition.
115
 While true that the EU Treaties have so far left the 
competence to regulate social policy to the member states,
116
 since the Lisbon 
strategy of 2000 there has been a push to modernise the European social model by 
investing in human resources and combating social exclusion. However, these 
exhortations were lost in the financial crisis and member state adherence to their 
sovereignty over social policy has thus far triumphed.
117
 Social institutions are also 
deeply embedded in each country’s larger societal framework and history and 
therefore cannot be easily amalgamated.
118
 
 
The Acquired Rights Drama 
 
43 The encouragement of cross-border competition would inevitably lead to 
corporate restructurings and it was acknowledged that such competition could then 
mean a loss of job security for employees subject to changes accomplished through 
reorganisations which could include business transfers. Thus a need arose to protect 
employee job security in the event of business transfers. The acquired rights 
legislation was born partly out of a growing concern about the absence of a “social 
face” to the Common Market119 as well as the fact that the prevailing frameworks in 
both Germany and France had already provided acquired rights legislation that 
protected employees on the transfer of a business and were consequently in a 
potentially disadvantageous competitive position with the rest of the EU lacking 
similar legislation.
120
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44 The premise of the ARD is that: 
 
“it is necessary to provide for the protection of employees in the event of a change of 
employer, in particular, to ensure that their rights are safeguarded.”121 
 
45 It operates to transfer employment contracts to the buyer of a business 
undertaking or part of a business undertaking,
122
 effectively granting employees a 
property right in their job.
 123
 Rights and obligations arising under the employment 
contracts transfer to the buyer. Both the buyer and the seller of the undertaking 
remain joint and severally liable in respect of those obligations arising prior to the 
transfer. Member states were given latitude in relation to any obligations to notify a 
buyer of the rights and obligations connected with the transferring contracts. The 
terms of collective agreements also transfer, though member states are given the 
option to limit the period for observing those terms and conditions. Pension rights 
are excepted from the operation of the Directive and will not transfer unless a 
Member state provides otherwise, as indeed France so provides.
124
 
 
46 The transfer does not constitute grounds for dismissal. Any dismissal by reason 
of the transfer is prohibited and will attract liability under a member states 
employment laws. Dismissals can be made if there is an economic, technical or 
organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce. If a contract is 
subsequently transferred and as a result there are substantial and detrimental 
changes in the conditions of the working environment, an employee may choose to 
deem his contract as terminated and the employer will be deemed responsible for 
that termination.
125
 Rights also extend to preserving the terms and conditions of 
employment. The terms of a contract cannot be changed by reason of the transfer 
unless such changes are agreed with the employees or their representatives.
126
 If 
terms are changed without due consultation, an employee may choose to resign 
citing an employer breach of the employment contract. In UK law, such a 
termination by an employee will be regarded as being a constructive dismissal.
127
 
There are also significant consultation and information requirements associated 
with business transfers which can incur significant liabilities for an employer if not 
properly done.
128
 
 
47 France has had acquired rights legislation protecting employment during 
business transfers in place since 1928. This law required that where there was a 
change in the juridical situation of an employer, such as the transfer of a business, 
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all employment contracts would continue between the new employer and 
employees of that enterprise.
129
 The failure of a business, except in cases of force 
majeure, would not free an employer from his obligation to respect the notice 
periods of its employees and provide an indemnity for any losses which may 
accrue.
130
 Today the position is the much the same, though the new employer is not 
liable for the obligations encumbering the old employer if the transfer is being 
made in relation to the sauvegarde procedure, redressement or judicial 
liquidation.
131
 
 
48 In contrast, the first UK legislation conferring continuity of employment on a 
business transfer
132
 would apply only if the employees were voluntarily retained by 
the purchasing firm. There was no concept of automatic transfer as this would 
conflict with the fundamental freedom of contract.
133
 For this reason, it was not 
until the Labour party came to power in the UK in 1997,
134
 under the promise of 
social justice and inclusion that the UK accepted the Social Chapter of the 
Maastricht Treaty, bringing the UK under the governance of EU social policy 
initiatives.
135
 As such, any directives passed under the Social Chapter would require 
implementation. 
 
Implementation of the Acquired Rights Directive 
 
49 Business transfers are a natural occurrence in the life of a business enterprise. 
The transfer of employees can benefit a purchaser through the experience and skill 
they bring to the enterprise. However, the position is not necessarily the same for 
the transfer conceived during insolvency procedures. The ARD now provides 
optional derogations in the case of insolvency procedures, but it has been unclear 
whether this would apply across the whole gamut of insolvency procedures or only 
in liquidation. Thus the acquired right drama begins, though not for all EU member 
states. For France, the concept of acquired rights was already a fundamental value 
enshrined within its legal system. In the UK, however, much case law has argued 
the point as to whether the implementing legislation, the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations
136
 1981 and 2006, should apply in 
business transfers out of administration and many writers have argued that its 
application to such a situation will have adverse effects on the outcome of the 
procedure owing to the inevitable reduction in the intrinsic value of the business 
due to the cost of liability associated with the transferring employment contracts. Its 
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effects could thus usurp both the aims of the rescue culture and the aims of the 
ARD in safeguarding employment. 
 
The Insolvency Exception 
 
50 The first ARD did not expressly exclude business transfers on insolvency from 
its scope, but following Abels
137
 the European Court of Justice said that it would 
not apply to transfers of undertakings which took place during the winding up of 
insolvent companies.
138
 Thus employee contracts would not transfer if a business 
was sold without the intention to continue trading.
139
 The effect was not so clear in 
relation to those insolvency procedures such as administration where one of the 
goals is to continue the business but an alternative outcome might be liquidation. 
Problems were recognised at an early stage in relation to the obligation to take over 
the liabilities associated with employment contracts in the context of rescue 
procedures as it was believed that this would act as a disincentive to the rescue of 
troubled businesses and would actually harm employees by not allowing their 
employer to be rescued from insolvency and protect at least some of the jobs.
140
 
 
51 In Abels, the Court argued that the interests of employees would be better served 
if the ARD 1977 did not apply on an insolvent business transfer with a view to 
liquidation as it would likely result in a loss of job security and worker welfare, 
contrary to the purpose of the directive. Further, the ARD might dissuade a 
potential transferee from acquiring parts of a business of the company due to costs 
associated with employees, leading to liquidation and resulting in the loss of all 
jobs. Another reason for relaxing the rules was attributed to the special nature of 
insolvency laws, designed to weigh up the competing interests involved. It was 
accepted that insolvency rules could derogate at least in part from the social policy 
bias toward the position of employees, given the potential adverse results it may 
otherwise have.
141
 
 
52 A distinction was drawn by the court in Abels between terminal and non-
terminal insolvency proceedings. This was incorporated in the ARD 1998
142
 which 
was then consolidated under the current ARD. Article 5(1) states that unless 
provided otherwise by a member state, employee contracts will not transfer where 
the transferor is the subject of insolvency proceedings instituted with a view to the 
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liquidation
143
 of the assets of the company under the supervision of a competent 
public authority.
144
 It was a choice available to each member state to apply this 
insolvency exception. The UK utilised this derogation but it did not fully solve the 
problem, rather, owing to a lack of specific definition within UK insolvency 
procedures, it complicated the matter. The series of European cases which clarify 
the position as to when the exclusion will apply is long and complex and have done 
little to clarify the position in the UK.
145
 The same controversy has never been 
present in the French system, which is no surprise given its influence on the 
enactment of the first ARD. The fact that such a fundamental difference in national 
policy exists demonstrates one level of difficulty associated with convergence in 
this area of the law. 
 
Corporate Rescue and Acquired Rights Conflict in the UK 
 
53 Given the history of Britain’s stubborn opposition to European social policy, it 
is a wonder that the ARD 1977 had any effect in the UK at all. The introduction of 
the concept of acquired rights radically altered the treatment of employment 
contracts during business transfers. Due to acquired rights legislation, employees 
subject to a business transfer would enjoy the benefit of an automatic transfer of 
their employment contracts to the purchaser of the business to which the employees 
were attached.
146
 The legislation also signified a departure from the previously rigid 
common law doctrine of freedom of contract as it imposes continuity of 
employment rather than terminating the employment relationship upon the change 
of party identities.
147
 
 
54 The initial implementation of the ARD brought little fanfare. It was expected 
that it would have little impact and would be of limited commercial importance, 
particularly for mergers and acquisitions as it did not apply to business transfers 
accomplished through share sales, while the ARD would only apply to business 
transfers occurring through asset sales leading to the sale of an economic entity, or 
a functioning business unit, which retains its identity following the transfer. It was 
envisaged that prior to the disposal of an insolvent undertaking, an insolvency 
practitioner would create a wholly owned subsidiary to which the business would 
be transferred to avoid the operation of the ARD. Employees would be retained by 
the transferor and then loaned out to the subsidiary, which operated with no 
employees under legal contract. The subsidiary business would then be disposed of 
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with no employment contracts to fetter the negotiations. This scheme of avoidance, 
termed “hiving down,” was clearly in breach of the aims of the ARD as it 
circumvented the protection of employment as was intended by the ARD. This 
practice no longer avoids the operation acquired rights under the TUPE 2006
148
 
following the judgment in Litster,
149
 which continues to apply despite amendments 
to the Regulations. 
 
55 The Conservative Government of the 1980s found the interference of EU social 
policy with UK sovereignty distasteful. After an arduous legislative process which 
began with a resentful copy and paste method of legislation in TUPE 1981,
150
 the 
UK has finally arrived at an implementation of the ARD which, at least to some 
extent, satisfies the minimum requirements for implementation in the TUPE 2006. 
Judicial development of the law has increased the impact of acquired rights, 
showing that a transferee could not simply dismiss transferring employees or insist 
on a change in terms and conditions.
151
 The cost of inherited employees has 
become a significant consideration in commercial negotiations now that the option 
of dismissing employees before the transfer
152
 and hiving down
153
 whereby the 
liability of employment contracts transfers could be avoided
154
 are no longer 
available. The absence of the commercially helpful procedures has made the 
question of the application of TUPE in corporate rescue procedures even more 
important to determine. 
 
56 A number of cases in the UK have continued to examine the position of 
corporate rescue procedures under the insolvency exception. Oakland v 
Wellswood
155
 was the first in a series of cases that have extended the reach of 
acquired rights into the realm of corporate rescue. In Oakland, the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal found that administration proceedings, in particular pre-pack 
administrations instituted with a view to liquidating the company, would benefit 
from the insolvency exception in TUPE.
156
 Employees subject to a pre-pack 
administration would not automatically transfer to the buyer of the business 
package. The company was deemed as being in a form of terminal insolvency and 
therefore subject to relevant bankruptcy proceedings as required by the exception 
in TUPE.
157
 There followed OTG,
158
 a case which sought to clarify certain 
questions left out in Oakland. Disagreeing with the approach in Oakland, an 
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absolute approach was taken which meant that the insolvency exception could 
never apply to administrations. It was viewed that the true purpose of 
administration would always default to the rescue of a company given the 
hierarchical nature of its description in Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986. As 
such, it could not be instituted with a view to liquidating the company.
159
 
 
57 A more recent case, Key2Law,
160
 argued on appeal that it was right to take a fact 
based approach, despite the seemingly prioritised terms of the administrator’s 
obligations of: 
 
(1) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(2) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors other than through liquidation, or 
(3) realising property to make a distribution to secured or preferential creditors.161 
 
58 It was viewed as unrealistic to regard rescuing a company as a going concern as 
reflecting the primary objective in administration. In practice, there are cases where 
there is no prospect for a rescue as the sole objective of an administration will 
result in the realisation of assets in the best interests of creditors.
162
 In this case the 
administration order had been made for the purpose of disposing of the undertaking 
to a third party for a consideration which would enable a distribution to creditors. It 
was argued that the administration order was therefore made with a view to 
liquidation and therefore fell within the intendment of the insolvency exception.
163
 
 
59 The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that in principle it was unsatisfactory to 
depend on evidence leading up to the making of an order as key in determining 
whether or not an administration procedure can be considered as having been taken 
with a view to liquidation. The fact based argument produces uncertainty as to the 
objective intended to be achieved by any administrative appointment, which is to 
firstly try to find a means of rescuing the undertaking. The Court also regarded it as 
wrong to identify the purpose of an administrative appointment by reference to the 
objectives of their pre appointment considerations, foreseeing what such an 
appointment may be reasonably likely to achieve. The determination must look to 
the purpose of the procedure triggered by the making of the order rather than the 
intention of the people involved in the making of it. To this end, the purpose of an 
administration is clearly set out in Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and its 
headline purpose is to try to rescue the business, only resorting to the liquidation of 
assets if that primary purpose proves impossible to achieve.
164
 In all cases, it is this 
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first objective with which all administrators must formally engage in before 
resorting to any others.
165
 The Court of Appeal has therefore solidified the 
approach to TUPE and administrations, firmly applying an absolutist approach as it 
has the merit of achieving legal certainty: all involved will know where they stand 
upon the appointment of an administrator.
166
 
 
60 The very fact that there has been such a long and arduous task of settling on the 
criteria upon which the insolvency exception would apply is exemplary of another 
important fundamental difference between the UK and France. The common law of 
the UK gives priority to the findings of judges and applies the principle of stare 
decisis, giving judicial decisions a legislative function through the adherence to 
precedent. The French civil law system, however, adheres to general principles of 
the law and a more strict separation of powers. A judge’s interpretation in the UK is 
used to create legal rules, which in a civil law system is a function solely ascribed 
to the legislator.
167
 Judges in civil jurisdictions, however, enjoy the authority of 
reason, exercising independence in their decision making from any similar cases 
which may have come before.
168
 As such, decisions in France may not always 
follow the exact same line of reasoning, depending on the case before them, but the 
same rule of law will habitually be applied. The functional differences in the legal 
systems, which apply not only to France and the UK, are another obstacle that 
continues to prevent convergence. 
 
The Current Position 
 
61 The basic position in the UK is that where proceedings are instigated with a 
view to resolving financial difficulty rather than liquidating the assets of the 
company, the employees of that company retain their acquired rights and transfer to 
any purchaser.
169
 The foregoing UK cases have entrenched this position in 
domestic law, with the effect that in any business sale by a company in 
administration, employees will automatically transfer to the buyer of that business. 
According to the Court, due to its very nature, administration proceedings can 
never be instituted with a view
170
 to liquidation,
171
 so TUPE will always apply to 
business transfers out of administration. This position is regarded as having a 
potentially serious effect on the sales of businesses out of administration unless 
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further jurisprudence or legislative amendment provides otherwise.
172
 A 
consultation on TUPE was recently undertaken in the UK but its focus was not on 
the effect of TUPE in business rescues situations and has suggested few changes 
that will affect its application in corporate rescue procedures.
173
 
 
62 The consequences for business rescue could be significant in relation to the 
outcome of transfer negotiations as the net value of the business will be reduced as 
a reflection of the increased risk exposure associated with transferring 
employees.
174
 A survey performed in the UK by R3 in 2011
175
 was taken among 
379 R3 members and showed that over 50% of insolvency practitioners have dealt 
with cases in a 12 month period where a buyer has either withdrawn or discounted 
its purchase price as a result of TUPE liability. 40% had seen cases where the 
purchaser had entered liquidation rather than being sold as a going concern as a 
result of buyers not wishing to take the financial risks associated with employee 
contracts. A further two thirds responded to a general query that the purchaser had 
withdrawn or reduced their purchase bid due to the impact of TUPE while the 1/3 
remaining replied that liquidation was a consequence of the impact of TUPE.
176
 
 
63 France had a provision for contractual acquired rights in place well before the 
ARD was introduced. The EU social policy position was in fact influenced by what 
already existed in French law. Thus France has not suffered a resistance to acquired 
rights given that the concept was born in that jurisdiction. It is interesting to note, 
however, that in the more recent reforms, France has chosen to relieve the burden 
of employment liabilities for certain of their corporate rescue procedures, while the 
most recent decrees have added additional consultation and information burdens. 
The UK, however, continues to struggle with its implementation of the ARD in 
relation to its effect on corporate rescue. Its application is, in fact, one of the more 
onerous in the EU. 
 
64 Considering the amount of cross-border business and the insolvencies which 
have occurred during the financial crisis, a diversity of approaches to employment 
protection is not necessarily a benefit as it confuses the process by allowing 
employees of the same company to be treated differently if in different 
jurisdictions. However, little has been done to try to harmonise approaches due to 
the resistance of member states to the interference of the EU in matters of national 
                                                 
172 See C. Fallon, “Employment: Sales of Insolvent Businesses – Employees Transfer or Not?” (May 
2011) Corporate Briefing 6. 
173 Department of Business Innovation and Skills, Consultation on the Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006, copy available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/transfer-of-undertakings-protection-of-employment-
regulations-tupe-2006-consultation-on-proposed-changes> (last accessed 15 June 2014). 
174 See S. Horne, “From a Question of Fact to An Absolute Rule” (2011) Employment Law Journal 2. 
175 The Association of Business and Recovery, the leading organisation for insolvency, restructuring 
and turnaround specialists in the UK.  
176 See A. Stephens and G. Palfrey, “TUPE and the Current State of Play” (2012 Autumn) Recovery 22. 
  Gant: Social Policy and Insolvency 75 
social policy. While coordination in insolvency has been a long process, it has 
reached a far more equitable space within the EIR that which currently exists for 
ARD implementation and, indeed, labour regulation generally. 
 
 
EU Coordination and Convergence 
 
Lack of Social Coordination 
 
65 The EIR in its current state leaves the governance of employee contracts 
affected by business transfers solely to the applicable law of the Member state. The 
proposed amendments to the EIR retain the same wording and intent but propose an 
additional provision in relation to acquired rights. INSOL Europe has 
recommended the inclusion of a second paragraph to the “Contracts of 
Employment” Article 10 of the Insolvency Regulation which clarifies the legal 
jurisdiction governing employment contracts affected by business transfers 
occurring under secondary proceedings. The inclusion of this paragraph is aimed at 
addressing the fact that different jurisdictions have different approaches to 
insolvent business transfers and acquired rights owing to the derogation available 
under the ARD. In acknowledging these different approaches and provisioning for 
them, INSOL Europe’s proposals fail to assist in resolving the broader issue of 
equalising the application of acquired rights in cross-border corporate rescue 
procedures, though admittedly this did not feature as an intention of the proposals. 
In addition, the discussions of upcoming reforms by EU institutions and related 
commentary also do not appear to consider the application of acquired rights 
together with reforms to the EIR. 
 
66 The wide divergence of the application of acquired rights in business transfer 
situations creates an opportunity for another species of forum shopping. The 
differences in the systems in terms of transferability of employees could become a 
consideration in the choices made when group companies find themselves in 
financial difficulty and must choose to close down or sell off certain parts of their 
operation throughout the EU. As the EIR is intended to reduce the ease with which 
insolvent companies can engage in forum shopping, it is reasonable to consider 
how diverse approaches to the ARD may influence the efficiency of cross-border 
corporate rescue procedures within the EU. 
 
67 The diversity of employment entitlements across the EU can affect the choices 
businesses make when deciding where to invest or divest. In those jurisdictions 
where employment regulation is more flexible, companies may develop labour 
intensive businesses to take advantage of the ease of changing employment 
contracts, dismissing employees, paying less in wages and social security. It may 
also be easier to shut down those businesses in times of financial difficulty.
177
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Flexible employment protection facilitates capricious investment and could 
potentially create greater instability in economies because businesses are able to 
come and go with greater ease.
178
 This also affects communities where businesses 
are dissolved as it will lead to fluctuating levels of unemployment, placing a greater 
dependence on State social security systems. 
 
68 If one considers choice of investment and divestment in different jurisdictions, 
economics with more flexibility in the labour market are likely to remain more 
volatile places for job security
179
 as well as for the maintenance of business 
integrity. The dissonance of applications of acquired rights interferes with this goal 
in so far as different jurisdictions will continue to attract different varieties of 
investment depending on the legal climate. It may therefore be reasonable to 
consider methods of coordination or convergence in this area in order to bring it 
into line with what is already present within the EIR and its forthcoming reforms. 
 
Seeking Convergence or Harmonisation 
 
69 While there are a number of arguments that individual states have made against 
harmonisation of social policy within the EU, there are also many arguments that 
support such action. Globalisation has made it possible for capital to relocate to 
jurisdictions which provide the most beneficial legal regimes in order to maximise 
profitable opportunities, as is evident with the utilisation of social dumping and the 
shifting of COMI under the EIR in order to gain the best advantage in insolvency 
procedures. A consequence of the mobility of capital is the need for individual 
nations to tailor their economies in order to attract and retain capital investment. 
The question arises as to why any kind of employment protection is necessary if the 
otherwise free play of market forces allow capital investment to side step protective 
efforts to invest elsewhere. In such a case, it could be argued that it makes more 
sense to craft employment law to serve the needs of business so that national 
companies can compete on a global stage. However, this argument ignores the fact 
that labour is not just a commoditised factor of production. In addition, the 
presence of EU social policy requires a certain level of investment in social 
protection, which makes competitive labour regulation impossible within the 
current framework, particularly in this case given the EU wide application of the 
ARD.
180
 The answer may be to entrench specific labour rights and protections 
associated with cross-border insolvency within the EIR itself in order to create a 
balance between jurisdictions for an overall convergent insolvency system.
181
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70 Competition continues to be a fuel which feeds investment choices and 
employment regulation plays an important role as a competitive force. Employers 
in one state gain advantages if labour and social laws permit them to engage in 
employment practices below the essential standards required in others. The EU 
approach to labour regulation in terms of requiring minimum standards of social 
protection fails to equalise the playing field. In order to equilibrate the competitive 
landscape within the EU, a broad equivalence in labour standards would be 
required.
182
 A reasonable starting point might be the relationship between corporate 
rescue and the ARD. The problem with this approach is that each system begins 
from a different perception with different aims and methods regarding social 
legislation and corporate rescue, both on a national level and under EU social 
policy legislation. 
 
71 The question remains, then, as to whether harmonisation would provide 
adequate benefits to justify the upheaval it would cause. One argument against 
harmonisation is that it would restrict the benefits which could flow from economic 
integration in the form of opening up and extending the market. Convergence of 
standards to a median level of protection between national systems at different 
stages of economic development would remove an individual comparative 
advantage from those states with lower social costs. Thus harmonisation potentially 
becomes a form of protectionism imposed by more developed economic systems 
for their own benefit.
183
 However, if one compares the two developed systems of 
the UK and France, the differences between them undermine this argument. Under 
the EU treaties it was agreed that harmonisation should be made possible by 
convergence and the approximation of laws within the single free EU Common 
Market. Free movement of people and capital should favour harmonisation as 
should the approximation of provisions laid down by EU law in regulatory or 
administrative form.
184
 As such, the idea that it may be unfair to force the lowering 
or raising of standards to meet some common level among member states is moot. 
EU membership itself precludes individual Member state pursuit of competitive 
advantages which cause imbalances in the Common Market. Unfortunately, the 
pursuit of harmonisation continues to encounter obstacles associated with 
jurisdictional factors relating to history, economy, society, culture and the 
idiosyncratic manner in which legal systems evolved in different jurisdictions. 
Politics also plays a heavily obstructionist role to aims of convergence. 
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Conclusion: Harmony or Dissonance? 
 
72 The EU Treaties have so far left the competence to regulate social policy to the 
member states.
185
 Even when drafting the first Treaties in the 1950s it was mainly 
France that sought to give more power to the European Economic Community in 
the field of social policy so that it might raise the level of protection in other 
member states to a level more equal to the system in France.
186
 However, the 
tension between the goal of harmonisation of social policy and the aim of the free 
market has made this difficult if not impossible.
187
 
 
73 There are few Regulations in the EU which deal with social policy issues; most 
social policy rules are legislated through Directives which are only binding on 
states as to the results to be achieved. The member states then have reasonable 
latitude to implement them through the means and methods that they see fit, often 
taking advantage of exclusions and caveats which not all member states will 
apply.
188
 As such, the European Employment Strategy has seen diverse 
implementation among the member states as a result of a gap between the EU level 
aims and national policies.
189
 While recently the importance of social policy has 
been strengthening in the EU, it remains a fractured subject among the member 
states which will not be easy to coordinate. 
 
74 The differences in labour flexibility among the states of the EU can cause 
instability in a jurisdiction and may arise to some degree where the application of 
employee acquired rights in business rescue is not so strict. This may also be an 
argument for the harmonisation of labour laws across the EU generally. In order to 
avoid this species of social dumping, it may be necessary to remove distortions in 
competition, such as flexible versus inflexible labour regulation in this case. While 
most descriptions of social dumping indicate undervalued labour in the sense that 
employees are paid lower wages and have less employment rights,
190
 it is 
reasonable that this concept could be applied to the rights of employees on business 
transfers as this also has an effect on the cost of doing business in a jurisdiction. As 
mentioned in the R3 report cited above, this can lead to a reduction in the price for 
a business transfer, the failure of a deal and potentially the failure of a rescue 
initiative, leading to liquidation and a far more debilitating loss of employment 
security. 
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75 As the future sees the slow meeting of minds among the European countries in 
relation to business orientated legislation under the umbrella of EU law such as the 
EIR, the position on social policy remains static and continues to vary quite widely 
between jurisdictions, as evidenced by the different approaches to the ARD in the 
UK and France and the fundamental differences that influence those approaches. 
The creation of the Common Market was intended to foster trading across national 
boundaries and a functioning bankruptcy system forms a part of legal regime 
needed to support the market.
191
 While the reasons why a similar treatment has not 
been given to labour regulation are myriad, there remains an argument that an 
equalisation across the member states might be best for all. Such a balancing could 
have the effect of fostering greater stability across the EU and certainly in 
individual member states whose legal regimes vary greatly. A starting point could 
be the focussed intersection of insolvency and employment protection within the 
ARD and its implementation throughout the EU member states. Given the 
advantages to the rescue culture that could be gained through the harmonisation of 
transfer of undertakings provisions in insolvency, it might not meet with the same 
level of resistance as other more emotive areas of social policy. If it were possible 
to apply harmonisation principles to this specific area, it could act as a template for 
further convergence in the area of social policy in the EU. 
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